character. Having differed, they came to high words and ultimately to blows. They were separated and reconciled by a third person who .showed them both sides of the shield. '

In this connection, I may also state that various attempts have been made at different times by different philosophers to reconcile and harmonise the *may a* theory of Sankara with the realistic doctrine of Ramanuja. But I find none more •illuminating, searching, logical and appealing than the exposition of Tattawabhushan. I am therefore prompted to give below an extract from it:—

(< If the world of time and^space is really relative to God, it cannot but be an illusion to think of it as something independent of Him •and to this illusion, every created being who has not attained the supreme illumination, is subject. The illusion is not due to any fault •of his, but is the necessary result of the conditions of his being. It must therefore be ascribed to God Himself, the author of his being.'

The question then occurs, whether a relative, dependent thing, .a thing which is nothing apart from its support, can be called a thing •at all when its relativity, its dependence is once seen. When the world ^ is seen to be related to God as thought to a thinker, as action to an agent, its concreteness is gone, it dwindles into an abstract quality And it seems unworthy of being affirmed in a way which may imply that it is anything apart from the Reality to which it belongs as a •quality. When God has been affirmed, when the Thinker has been .affirmed, the world. His thought, seems to

have been affirmed also,
and it appears foolish, a mere concession to
popular ignorance, to
Affirm, the existence of the world
separately. The popular notion
of the world is that of a concrete
independent reality. The idea
of such a reality ^s truly sublated—proved
to be false—by true know-
ledge. To the idealist, to the Vedantist, the
world ceases to exist
.as a reality, *i.e.,* as a concrete independent
object; when, therefore,
he says with the unenlightened masses that
the ^vorld exists, he is •
aware of using *Vyavaharika, i.e.,* popular or
practical language and
not giving utterance to *payamarthika* or
real truth. When the re-
lativity of things has been seen, when God
has been seen to be the
only concrete, independent, absolute
reality, a distinction cannot but
be made between absolute truth and truth
that is only relative. The
existence of the world is seen to be only
relative truth, the only ab-
s'olute truth being the existence of God.
And when we see that things
are not what they seem, we cannot but
wonder at the power which